Liberty University Journal of
Statesmanship & Public Policy
Volume 1

Issue 2

Article 6

January 2021

Cyber Mutually Assured Destruction & Counterproliferation for the
21st Century: “How I stopped worrying and learned to love the
software exploit.”
Peter R. Pattara
Liberty University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/jspp
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Pattara, Peter R. (2021) "Cyber Mutually Assured Destruction & Counterproliferation for the 21st Century:
“How I stopped worrying and learned to love the software exploit.”," Liberty University Journal of
Statesmanship & Public Policy: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/jspp/vol1/iss2/6

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Liberty University Journal of Statesmanship & Public Policy by an authorized editor of Scholars
Crossing. For more information, please contact scholarlycommunications@liberty.edu.
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Cyber Mutually Assured Destruction & Counterproliferation for the 21st Century
In the twentieth century, the United States inherited the role of the British Empire and
became a global geopolitical hegemon. In its quest to take on that mantle, the United States
revolutionized geopolitical competition by developing nuclear weapons. The unique opportunities
and challenges these weapons created took many years to integrate into strategic planning. This
parallels the twenty-first century revolution of international competition through the introduction
of cyberspace as a theater of competition. The development of the internet, and its inevitable
weaponization, has presented the strategic community with an ongoing challenge. How can the
United States integrate cyber threats into their strategic calculus? A solution may be found in the
principles that nuclear strategy uses to deter and overcome threats. This paper will dissect the
nuclear strategy to identify those principles, construct a framework for cyberspace integration, and
make some policy proposals for implementation.
Strategic Nuclear Weapon Doctrine
The United States has two separate approaches in addressing nuclear threats. They are
categorized by near-peer nation-states, which already possess nuclear weapons, and non-peers or
non-state actors, who do not possess nuclear weapon capabilities. The differing strategies are
colloquially referred to as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Counterproliferation. The
principles of each, deterrence and survivability, and operational disruption or destruction can be
seen through an examination of the strategy.
Near-Peers & Mutual Assured Destruction
It is important to consider that the United States unilaterally introduced nuclear weapons
to the world by bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki; however, this provided only a short-lived
advantage since the nuclear arms race soon gave adversaries like the Soviet Union matching
nuclear capabilities.1 Such countries with matching capabilities are the near-peer states relevant to
this discussion. MAD became the doctrine of choice against these states. In short, MAD deters
nuclear conflict by ensuring a credible retaliatory capability exists, to make adversaries believe
that their survivability value in the open conflict expression is nil. Originally proposed under the
Eisenhower Administration, it was known as “massive retaliation,” and was designed to deter
Soviet aggression with the strategic goal of nuclear superiority.2 For clarity, MAD proposed that
since nuclear weapons were so destructive, their use must be prevented at all costs. Therefore,
planners proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union must deter each other from
employing such weapons. The best deterrent was thought to be ensuring that a survivable
capability existed to retaliate and defeat the attacking party.3 It is important to note that this policy
was not simply diplomatic rhetoric; rather, it was credibly reinforced by armed force doctrine,
technology, and forces.
Under President Eisenhower, strategic planners developed the Nuclear Triad of forces,
including Strategic Air Command’s bombers, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) to ensure the capability of American forces to
1
David McDonough, “Nuclear Superiority or Mutually Assured Deterrence: The Development of the US
Nuclear Deterrent,” International Journal 60, no. 3 (2005): 812.
2
Ibid, 812.
3
Ibid, 814.
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launch a retaliatory strike if nuclear war broke out. 4 The Triad provided a “second-strike”
capability. Interestingly, the Soviets took this second-strike capability further and are alleged to
have developed man-portable nuclear weapons, which the KGB First Directorate covertly
deployed to Western nations for clandestine operatives to use if war broke out and the Soviet
military were unable to launch their traditional nuclear capabilities.5
Counterproliferation Strategy
State Actors
The United States also utilized a complementary strategy towards nation-states which had
not developed nuclear weapons. For states actively developing nuclear weapons, the United States’
tool of choice has become known as counterproliferation, referring to the effort to physically,
technically, and diplomatically prevent a state from obtaining nuclear capabilities. Several Military
Mission Areas were developed for the Department of Defense: most notably, WMD Interdiction,
Offensive Operations, and Elimination.6 Under these operations, the United States would intercept
materials to create nuclear weapons, eliminate development program nodes, or destroy a nuclear
weapons program, not entirely dissimilar to the Israeli Operation OPERA which destroyed the
Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq.7 For those states which were not actively seeking nuclear weapons,
the United States employed a full range of activities, which included extensive intelligence
gathering to detect attempts to proliferate, actions to dissuade potential suppliers, and enable allies
for counterproliferation. Diplomatically, treaties and tools were drafted to allow peaceful
engagement between states, with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) serving as a high-level
illustrative example.
Non-State Actors
Not all nuclear threats come from nation-states; some non-state actors like terrorist
organizations could potentially present a nuclear threat. The United States’ counterterrorism forces
accounted for such a contingency, and the counterproliferation policy was adapted in the 1980-90s
to address the growing threat from terrorism.8 The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
created the “0400” mission area to physically interdict against terrorist proliferation. JSOC
assigned Special Missions Units (SMUs) including elements of Task Force Green/Combat
Applications Group (TF-Green) and Task Force Blue/Naval Special Warfare Development Group
(TF-Blue) to these mission sets. Elements from the SMUs were kept on ready alert to respond to
and capture nuclear material or destroy terrorist nodes seeking nuclear material. To summarize,
the United States adopted a posture of deterrence through MAD against peer nation-states and
operational mission areas to disrupt smaller adversaries weapon acquisition efforts.

4

Ibid, 814.
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-40: Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Department of Defense,
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Strategic Similarity Between Nuclear & Cyber
International competition in cyberspace shares significant similarity in a strategic sense
with the nuclear arms race of the Cold War. The unilateral discovery of each technology and their
destructive potential acts as an example. These similarities make a compelling justification for
comparison and application of the lessons from nuclear weapon strategy.
Unilateral Technological Revolution
The initial versions of the internet took shape in the late 1960s with the Advanced Research
Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), which laid the groundwork for the modern internet
networks observed today. This technology changed the very nature of strategic competition by
opening an entirely new theater of operations that was fundamentally different from any seen
before.9
The weaponization of the internet, like the weaponization of nuclear fission, began with an
American Special Access Program (SAP). For nuclear weapons, the United States had the
Manhattan Project. In cyberspace, the United States began the program known as NITRO ZEUS.10
The cyber Hiroshima was the deployment of a virus known as Stuxnet by NITRO ZEUS forces to
destroy Iranian industrial Uranium enrichment facilities.11 It is worth noting that open-source
intelligence indicates that Stuxnet was developed under the NITRO ZEUS program, but the virus
may have been launched by Israeli cyber forces who collaborated with the American National
Security Agency on the program under another SAP codenamed OLYMPIC GAMES.12 Despite
this, the use of the virus can be considered the beginning of the cyber arms race similar to the Cold
War nuclear arms race.
Destructive Capability
The destructive potential of cyberweapons should be explored and defined clearly.
Cyberweapons themselves can range in destructive potential, from small and minimally
destructive attacks to much larger attacks. It cannot be understated that offensive cyber operations
can create physical degradation, disruption, or destructive effects.13 Under NITRO ZEUS, the
NSA’s Tailored Access Operations unit penetrated Iranian cyber networks and implanted software
exploits inside transportation, electrical, air defense, and military communication networks.14 The
exploits were designed to monitor activity and could activate on command to blackout the
electrical grid, blind air defense networks, sabotage transportation, and silence military

9

Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12: Cyberspace Operations (Department of Defense, 2018), IV-15.
David Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power
(Portland: Broadway Books, 2013).
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Ibid.
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Robert Cromwell, “Cyberwar – USA.” Cromwell Intelligence. March 2018. https://cromwellintl.com/cybersecurity/cyberwar/usa.html
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Benjamin B. Hatch, “Defining a Class of Cyber Weapons as WMD: An Examination of the Merits”,
Journal of Strategic Security 11, no. 1, (2018): 45.
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David E. Sanger & Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Had Cyberattack Plan if Iran Nuclear Dispute Led to Conflict,”
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communication networks.15 High impact malware could even be considered a weapon of mass
destruction since they meet the characteristics of destructive design, mass casualty capability, and
are considered special weapon systems.16 In direct application to the United States, a cyber-attack
on the American power grid could be economically and socially devastating. A Lloyd’s of London
threat assessment of such a strike estimated an economic loss in excess of $243 billion dollars17
and substantial loss of life.18 From these premises, it can be logically concluded that nuclear and
cyberweapons are sufficiently similar, justifying the integration of cyberweapons into the weapon
of mass destruction strategic framework.
Strategic Framework for Cyberweapons
Considering these nuclear strategy characteristics and the similarity between each
technology, a logical approach may be to scale United States cyber response based upon the nature
of each threat. To form a cyber framework, the nuances of near-peer states and other adversaries
must be addressed. This framework ought to pursue the same general objectives of the nuclear
strategy, in short, to prevent the use of such weapons, through deterrence, and spread of the
weapons, via operational disruption.
Near-Peer States
Against near-peer state adversaries, the United States’ objective ought to parallel the
objective against nuclear threats. The comprehensive tools, diplomatic, intelligence, and military
used against nuclear weapons retain strategic relevance. It is in the strategic interest of the United
States to prevent conflict rather than simply prevailing to avoid the consequences. As Sun Tzu
said:
“Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme
excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. The best victory is
when the opponent surrenders of its own accord before there are any actual hostilities... It
is best to win without fighting.”19
The chief difficulty with any deterrence strategy using MAD is ensuring that a capability
can credibly present a second-strike threat. Further, the strategy should avoid escalation to nuclear
conflict. To accomplish this objective, this paper suggests two policy implementations to establish
survivable cyber deterrence.

Paul Szoldra, “The US could have destroyed Iran’s entire infrastructure without dropping a single
bomb,” Business Insider, July 6, 2016, https://www.businessinsider.com/nitro-zeus-iran-infrastructure-2016-7.
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Implanted Exploits
The United States could adopt a deterrence posture by developing implanted software
exploits to be triggered as a second strike. This approach is like the Soviet tactic of smuggling
nuclear devices into western nations covertly so clandestine agents could employ them against
NATO targets. The technical viability of this strategy has been explored by the original NITRO
ZEUS program in the Iranian context.20 The exploits designed by the NSA against Iranian
infrastructure could have been like weapons of mass destruction. Such exploits on systems like
electric power or water purification could cause significant loss of life which would serve to raise
the cost of conflict and therefore deter it. Open-source information indicates that the Russian
Federation has undertaken cyber-attack measures against the United States’ infrastructure, which
could be intended for such a purpose.21 Admittedly, this tool would provide only limited
effectiveness since MAD requires a credible risk. Covert exploits cannot be openly acknowledged,
lest the adversary disable them. Thus, credibility would be difficult to establish and the deterrent
effect would be minimal.
Submersible Ship Data Nuclear (SSDN)
The United States could also design survivable cyber-attack infrastructure from which a
second strike could be launched. This follows closely with the strategic thinking behind the
submarine-launched ballistic missile programs which began early in the Cold War. Traditional
data center architecture raises survivability concerns that a modified submarine design could
mitigate. Naturally, such an architecture would raise infrastructure and connectivity challenges,
but those can be mitigated in the design. Nuclear submarines have already necessitated the
development of highly sophisticated cooling systems to regulate reactor core temperatures. These
solutions could be applied to overcome the chief concern for data center servers, which is heat.
Such a system could also utilize advanced terahertz frequency lasers to conduct ultrafast frequency
modulation for frequency shifting high data-bit transmission to prevent jamming and backscatter
attacks.22 In a cyber strike contingency, the submarines could connect to land or satellite internet
ports using the laser transmitters and launch retaliatory cyberweapons. It is worth stressing that
this tool would not solve the challenges of identifying and attributing cyber-attacks, which are
even more difficult due to obfuscation via dark or deep web networks.
Counter Cyber Proliferation
Against non-state actors or states, a modified counterproliferation strategy could be
employed. It remains in the strategic interest of the United States to continue efforts to prevent the
spread of highly technical cyberweapons like advanced persistent threats. A Counter Cyber
Proliferation (CCP) strategy which includes diplomatic, intelligence, and military components,
would mirror existing counterproliferation regimes. The military implementation would be a
mission area dedicated to interdicting against adversaries developing cyber capabilities.

Sanger & Mazzetti, “U.S. Had Cyberattack Plan if Iran Nuclear Dispute Led to Conflict.”
Hatch, “Defining a Class of Cyber Weapons as WMD,” 49.
22
Aniela Dunn et al., “High-speed modulation of a terahertz quantum cascade laser by coherent acoustic
phonon pulses”, Nature Communications 11, no. 835 (2020): 1.
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Joint Special Operations Task Force - Cyber
This would require a dualistic approach utilizing traditional special mission forces to
physically interdict nodes, destroying equipment, disrupting planning cycles, and detaining hostile
actors. Such an approach would also involve similar mission areas in the cyber theater, for instance
physically destroy threatening cyber infrastructure or capturing hostile cyber personnel. To this
end, creating a JSOC task force to interdict and destroy cyberweapon program nodes and
organizations would complement the existing task forces and provide a highly enhanced lethality
to the DOD’s counterproliferation mission. These missions would likely follow the F3EAD model
(Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate) refined by JSOC task forces throughout the
Global War on Terror (GWOT). The most significant challenge to counterproliferation against
cyber threats is the attribution of attacks and precursor activity especially through deep or dark
web,23 but existing capabilities are projected to resolve this issue.
Further, attribution was a challenge for JSOC during the GWOT, but it was largely solved
through rigorous intelligence collection and interagency integration of intelligence collectors and
networks into the kill chain. Intelligence professionals identified targets and armed forces
personnel captured or eliminated the identified targets to spur further intelligence collection.
Additionally, establishing a cyber-centric SMU under the JSOC operational umbrella could permit
the command to conduct operations through cyberspace and integrate expertise. The same
principle drove the establishment of TF-Green’s Heavy Breaching Cell to overcome unique
challenges presented by reinforced underground bunkers in counterproliferation missions.24 These
operational moves could improve strategic posture and prevent further hostile cyberweapon
development. Though outside this paper’s scope, diplomatic planners should also consider the
proposition of emulating the NPT in a cyber context to formalize permitted and non-permitted
scientific and technological research or regulating advanced computing capabilities like quantum
computing with enforcement and monitoring mechanisms reminiscent of the NPT.
Conclusion
The United States faces growing challenges in the international community. The peace
dividend following the collapse of the Soviet Union was expected to bring about a lasting, peaceful
world order. Instead, global anarchy has increased. The world of cyberspace has opened the United
States to previously untold avenues of attack. This has challenged the strategic calculus and created
much fear in the American public. However, such situations have been resolved before. Similar
strategic disruptions occurred following the development of the nuclear bomb. The United States
adopted a strategic posture to deter peers from using nuclear weapons and disrupt proliferation of
nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. The nuclear strategy can serve as a model for adapting to
the threats from cyberspace. Deterring near-peer adversaries and countering cyberweapon
development programs within a novel framework can improve the United States’ national security
posture and better protect its citizens. Of additional importance are diplomatic policies, like
proposing a cyber non-proliferation treaty, but they remain outside the scope of this paper and may
be an appropriate area for future research and consideration.

23
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